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Currency, Coinage and the Gold Standard
Marcello de Cecco
European University Institute, Florence
For nearly three thousand years coined weights of metal have 
been used as money and for just as long gold, silver and copper 
have been the preferred metals for minting coins. Currencies con­
sisting of coins whose value is expressed by the weight of the 
metal contained in them at market prices, however, have seldom 
been used.
Until the inception of metallist reforms, the necessary 
amounts of the metals required for coinage were brought to the 
Mint by the sovereign or by the public. The sovereign's monetary 
prerogative consisted in fixing the Mint price of the metal, i.e. 
how many coins of a certain denomination could be coined from a 
given weight of metal. The Mint price was established with refer­
ence to a money of account, and it could diverge, and very often 
did, from the market price of the metal. When the sovereign deemed 
it necessary to devalue his coinage, he could change the parity 
between the coins and an "ideal" currency, usually one which had 
circulated in the past. This made it unnecessary to resort to re­
coinage operations. The latter were also available but were con­
sidered as more radical policies, while changing the relative 
value of coins in terms of the "ideal" currency was a more gradual 




























































































was only very rarely that the sovereign would renounce his pre­
rogative of giving coins a face value by law. Indeed, for many 
students of money this sovereign prerogative was what transformed 
a coined metal into money. Theodor Mommsen wrote some unfor­
gettable passages of his "History of Roman Money" on the tardo 
imperial decision to resort to free minting of gold coins whose 
value was given by their weight at market prices. To him this was 
the lowest point reached in the degradation of Roman monetary 
sovereignty. A Roman coin had always been taken at its face value, 
whatever its weight. Indeed, this had been the chief testimony of 
the credibility of the Roman State.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, none among the successor 
states can be said to have enjoyed, in the following centuries, an 
equivalent degree of monetary sovereignty. The plurality of 
successor states implied a plurality of currencies, with ample 
possibility of speculating and arbitraging between currencies. 
Citizens learned to defend themselves when the sovereign's privi­
lege became exorbitant. Seignorage tended to be inversely corre­
lated with the commercial openness of States. The less truck sub­
jects had with foreigners, the greater the divergence between the 
legal and the intrinsic value of coins could be. A trading nation 
very soon found that it had to have a currency whose value corre­
sponded to its metallic content. With the rise of the absolute 
state, the sovereign's monetary privilege tended again to become 
exorbitant. The ratio of internal to international trade in­
creased, in spite of the rise of mercantilism, and the fiscal use 
of money by the State became greater. It is obvious that this 




























































































difficult for the sovereign's subjects, who could onJy defend 
themselves by changing prices, provided that had not been declared 
illegal by the sovereign. Metallist reforms were an expression of 
the new power acquired by the subjects vis-à-vis the State. At the 
core of these reforms was the actual coinage of the "idea!" money 
as a real full bodied coin, whose weight and fineness was decreed, 
and this coin became the "standard" of the national monetary sys­
tem. The sovereign, by these reforms, saw his monetary preroga­
tives diminished to that of a keeper of weights and measures. In 
the intentions of the reforms' advocates, it was a way of consti- 
tutionalising the sovereign, so that he would be compelled to 
resort openly to his fiscal powers, which had been constitutional - 
ised long before.
The Gold Standard was just one of the possible metallic 
standards. It was adopted in England, while the French preferred 
to choose a silver standard. In the course of the following centu­
ries intellectual debate centred around the choice of metaJ and 
economists, statesmen, intellectual s, declared themselves in 
favour or against, silver or gold, in favour of or against, bi­
metallism or monometallism. But the basic choice in favour of a 
pure metallic standard, where an actual coin whose value as given 
by the weight of its metal content at market prices was the only 
money of account available, was not seriously discussed again for 
a long time, until the development of banking and the integration 





























































































The great metallist reforms were the outcome of the intellec­
tual movement which would later take the name of "political econo­
my". This is now used to define an academic subject, taught in 
universities, but between the second half of the seventeenth cen­
tury and the first decades of the nineteenth, it became an intel­
lectual, almost a political, movement. It was composed of men who, 
in many countries, believed that human society was organised ac­
cording to natural principles, which could be studied by the same 
methods used to inquire into the world of nature. Ey scientific 
inquiry the laws which governed society could be discovered and 
the action of the state could be made to agree with them. In par­
ticular, the laws governing the production and distribution of 
commodities could be discovered, and the principles according to 
which value was conferred upon goods and services. The political 
economists soon found themselves considerably disturbed by the 
existence of a human institution. Money, which continually inter­
fered with the process of commodity valuation. As hinted above, 
they tried to devise a solution which would allow society to enjoy 
the advantages of using money while being spared the problems 
which the creation and use of money entailed. The solution was a 
commodity money, a monetary regime whose standard would be a coin 
made of a metal of fixed weight and fineness. They hoped that a 
commodity money would free the economic world from the uncertain­
ties induced by the raids of those who exercised or usurped mone­
tary sovereignty. A pure metallic money would be subject to the 
same laws of value to which other commodities were subject; its 





























































































By advocating the adoption of a pure metallic standard, the 
political economists were thus killing two birds with one stone. 
They were putting a stop to the exorbitant privilege of the State, 
which used its monetary prerogative to tax people without asking 
for the powers to do so, and were also recommending a type of 
money which would not disturb the functioning of economic laws, 
since it obeyed those laws. By the adoption of a pure metallic 
standard, a truly neutral money could be relied upon.
If the desires of political economists were important in 
actually pushing forward the adoption of metallic standards, 
however, it was more because both governing circles and public 
opinions were anxious to put an end to the previous system, which 
was based on uncertainty and sovereign privilege, than because of 
a widely felt need to put economic theory on a sounder theoretical 
footing.
In this respect British experience is different from the 
French. In England, a metallic standard had been in use since soon 
after the great recoinage of the end of the seventeenth century. 
At the turn of the next century, Sir Isaac Newton, the Master of 
the Mint, had established the canonical weight for the Pound ster­
ling in gold, at 123.274 grains of gold at 22/24 carats (corre­
sponding to 7.988 grammes at the title of 0.916). Free minting 
remained possible but, as very little silver was coined, silver 
coins were soon demoted by the public to the role of subsidiary 




























































































edges, and were badly worn, because of repeated clipping. Thus, 
early in the XVIII century, England went on the Gold Standard.
In France metallist reform had to wait until the Revolution. 
After an early attempt to introduce the Gold Standard, and a gi­
gantic outflow of gold under the Terror government, in the year XI 
of the Revolution the free minting of both gold and silver was 
declared. One Franc was given a weight of 5 grammes of silver at 
9/10 title. A fixed parity was also established between gold and 
silver, although the French legislators, in the Report of the 
Comité de Monnayes, in 1790, had declared that a permanently 
fixed parity between the two metals was impossible, and had quoted 
Newton and Locke to corroborate their declaration. Bimetallism was 
thus instituted in France, and would last almost as long as the 
Gold Standard in England, but from the beginning it was understood 
that the parity between gold and silver would have to be changed 
when necessary, even if it was to be done by law each time. The 
French lawmakers gave life, therefore, to a system which we would 
call today of fixed but adjustable parity between gold and silver.
Contemporary literature devoted much attention to the rela­
tive virtues of mono- and bimetallism. Modern economic literature, 
however, starting from the end of the first world war, has almost 
exclusively focussed on Gold Monometallism. From the point of view 
of monetary history this is a pity because what goes commonly 
under the name of the International Gold Standard was, on the con­
trary, a complex system composed of a monometallist and a bimetal­
list part, where the importance of the former was not greater, for 
the functioning of the whole system, than that of the latter. We 




























































































Standard essentially required the existence of a bimetallist peri­
phery, which surrounded the monometallist centre.
Let us first concentrate on the British Gold Standard. After 
it had been in existence for close to a century it had to be sus­
pended in 1797, because of the difficulties which the Napoleonic 
wars entailed for monetary management. In the period of over twen­
ty five years in which cash payments remained suspended, a very 
lively debate took place among political economists, politicians, 
bankers, and industrialists on how suspension affected internal 
and international economic relations. Some of the best pages in 
the history of political economy were written as contributions to 
that debate.
Specie payments had been suspended by an Order in Council in 
February, 1797. The same decree had undertaken that they be re­
sumed, at par, six months after a definitive peace treaty had been 
signed. In the intervening period of open hostilities, the curren­
cy had depreciated, the Government had incurred a huge debt which 
was largely in the hands of City financiers, and war demand for 
all sorts of commodities had favoured the amassing of great for­
tunes by a bevy of "homines novi". As peace approached it was 
found that a resumption at the old parity would enhance the post­
war slump which already appeared after Waterloo. This prospect 
united landowners and industrialists, who had been natural enemies 
heretofore, against creditors, Government Debt holders, and in 
general people with fixed incomes. Because of its huge debt the 




























































































had, however, muddled through the war by putting up a system by 
which it held bond prices up and kept the financial market favour­
able to new debt issues. The system consisted of redeeming old 
long-term debt and replacing it by floating debt. Pascoe Grenfell 
and David Ricardo were quick to chastise the Government's debt 
management policy. In 1816 and 1817 the Government's balancing act 
was successful but in 1818 it came unstuck, as the Government had 
to buy stock dear and sell it cheap. Meanwhile, the ratio of fun­
ded to floating debt had fallen, and this precluded the possibili­
ty of reducing the main debt.
Resumption was as highly political a measure as Restriction 
had been. The Whig opposition railed against Restriction, calling 
the Government a committee of the Bank of England. And, indeed, 
the Bank did its best to make the accusation credible. It tried to 
blackmail the Government into a continuation of Restriction by 
threatening to stop its support of the Government's debt manage­
ment policy. It also threatened to stop accomodating Meyer Nathan 
Rothschild, who was the principal holder of Government Stock. But 
Resumption had also its advocates within the Cabinet, Huskisson, 
for instance, who with Parnell, Henry Thornton, and Francis 
Horner had drafted the Bullion Report in J810 and had thus perma­
nently alienated traditional City interests. He had advocated a 
prompt resumption in a memorandum he submitted in 1816, and again, 
early in J819, he submitted a memorandum calling for prompt re­
sumption accompanied by fiscal deflation. The Government then 
appointed a Secret Committee to consider resumption, which soon 




























































































was discussed in Parliament, Ricardo's vehement advocacy of re­
sumption definitively swung parliamentary opinion. Payments were 
resumed, at the old parity, in May, 1819. Ricardo called the de­
cision to resume "a triumph of science, and truth, over prejudice, 
and error". It certainly was a triumph of new City blood over old 
financial interests, who had thrived in the easy days of infla­
tionary finance, lending to financially weak Governments, at rates 
they themselves pushed up by manipulating the money market.
After resumption at the old parity, a shock wave went through 
all British economic circles. The Gold Standard did seem to have 
no advocates left among manufacturers and financiers. The Bank of 
England had been against it all along, and so menacing had been 
its representations that the Government had been driven by such 
impudence to breaking its useful wartime alliance with it, which 
had rested, it now appeared, on easy money. Landowners, on the 
contrary, were pleased. A measure that made them poorer in capital 
values, gave them, at the same time, a greater real value for 
their rents. It also represented a restoration of old values 
against the encroachment of industry and its social evils, which 
had occurred during Restriction. If the Gold Standard was bad for 
industry, which had flourished under the Paper Pound, then the 
relative power of the Old Order, which Agriculture represented, 
would grow again.
The Bullionists, who had campaigned for a resumption at the old 
parity, believed that a deflation would purge society of the most- 
glaring speculators, of unsound industrialists, and, more general­
ly, of upstarts who had grown rich on easy money. At the same time 




























































































and we have Huskisson's testimonial to this belief - into the 
chief bullion market of the world. London would become the "sett­
ling house of the money transactions of the world". The intention 
was thus to favour the New City, to be "Mart and Banker" to the 
world, rather than its workshop.
Finally, resumption was seen as an instrument of social jus­
tice. Deflation would give back to creditors, who had lent their 
money to their country in war time, the full value of what they 
had lent. To politicians, an automatic Gold Standard looked like a 
relief from the heavy responsibilities of managing the economy. 
It would restore them to true political activity and mark the 
final transition to Peace.
The French monetary reform was very different. It was aimed 
directly against the Ancien Regime, seen however in its fiscal 
capacity, and not as an unholy alliance of politicians and finan­
ciers. It ended up by establishing a long lasting bimetallic sys­
tem, which did not overlook the interests of those whose prices 
were fixed in silver, like wage earners and petty traders. The 
Reform thus did not represent a clearly determined social choice, 
like the resumption in Britain. A more neutral system was devised, 
which tried to accomodate both the third and the fourth estate. 
The revolutionary experience was too recent to invite, by a defla­
tionist monetary regime, new social disorders. It is somewhat 
ironic to see how the country on the verge of defeat opted for a 




























































































ous country would choose. In both countries money was constitu- 
tionalised, but in Britain, the coalescence of interests of the 
New City and the landowners made the country the world pivot of 
monetary radicalism. It is fair to say that the expectations of 
those who had favoured the Gold Standard in Britain were not ful­
filled. Deflation brought in its wake unemployment and social 
disorder. It also induced British industrial producers to invade 
world markets, as home demand shrank. The benefits the New City 
interests had expected did indeed materialise, but only a few 
decades later. The Gold Standard induced export-led growth in 
Britain, and to become "mart and banker" to the world she first 
had to become the workshop of the world. The mechanisms the 
bullionists had set working thus functioned in reverse. But it 
would be unfair to say that Huskisson's expectations were repre­
sentative of those of all bullionists. David Ricardo, for one, 
expected the Gold Standard to bring about industrial expansion. 
And he wanted industrial growth to employ the labour made avail­
able by the working of the Law of Population, in which he firmly 
believed.
The Gold Standard was supposed to check the power of the Bank 
of England, which seemed to have become so great under the Paper 
Pound as to represent a threat to a truly constitutional institu­
tion like Parliament. But its actual functioning enhanced that 
power even further. As Britain became the workshop of the world 
and Sterling was more and more widely used as an international 
currency, the importance of London as a financial centre grew 




























































































tional payments system founded on Britain's industrial and finan­
cial supremacy. The Bank of England's importance as a commercial 
bank was enhanced by its monopoly position as a joint stock bank. 
Just as it had flourished as the chief source of Government fi­
nance under restriction, the Bank flourished as a commercial bank 
as a result of Britain's ascent to industrial and commercial 
leadership.
Its international pre-eminence was always dependent on its 
domestic primacy. Under the auspices of the Bank's monopoly, the 
centralised reserve system, which remained for a long time unique 
to Britain, was developed. It was a very lean and efficient sys­
tem, which minimised the amount of cash needed to oil the wheels 
of the domestic payments network. But it was also highly unstable, 
since its leanness did not tolerate any serious obstacle which 
might appear in the national and international flow of cash and 
capital. The fact that it could carry on for such a long time, 
until the First World War, is explained by a series of fortunate 
circumstances which occurred in succession. We shall examine them 
in some detail. «
We must, however, strongly underline the fact that, under the 
Gold Standard, Britain experienced very strong cyclical swings. 
The hundred years after resumption were marked by commercial and 
financial crises which recurred about every ten years, even if the 
last part of the period saw crises appear at longer intervals than 
before. The regularity of crises gave rise to much monocausal the­
orising, and the Gold Standard was often indicted as one of the 
chief culprits. It was, by contemporary opinion, accused of being 




























































































the economy. Critics invariably quoted the French and then the 
German monetary systems, as preferable, since they were supposed 
to possess a greater degree of flexibility and made possible bet­
ter management of the economy.
Yet, in spite of a very lean centralised reserve, and of re­
current financial crises, Britain never abandoned the Gold Stand­
ard. One of the most important reasons why she was not compelled 
to do so under the pressure of crises must be found, as we noted 
earlier, in the peculiar features the international financial 
system possessed in the combination of a monometallic and a bi­
metallic part. Since oldest antiquity, silver was the metal pre­
ferred by the Far East for coinage. And for almost as long as 
history goes, the Western trade balance with the Far East has 
shown a deficit. A structural trade imbalance with the Far, East 
meant a continuous export of silver towards the East. Around the 
middle of the 19th century this structural trend combined with 
gold discoveries to depress the price of gold. In the last thirty 
years of the century, however, the trend was reversed, as silver 
started to be abandoned by most developed countries as a monetary 
standard. The gold-silver parity rose accordingly.
Throughout the century, London retained a quasi monopoly of 
gold and silver transactions. And it maintained, without any 
interruption, a free gold market. It is certain that it could not 
have afforded to do so, had first France and, later on, the Indian 




























































































The Anglo-French financial connection is one of the most 
fascinating, and least researched, features of the 19th century 
international payments system. From what we know, however, it 
appears that the much greater liquidity the French monetary system 
retained throughout the 19th century was skillfully exploited by 
Britain. Bank rate would be raised when pressure was felt on the 
Bank of England's reserve, but the expectation was that gold would 
flow mainly from Paris. Why did it flow? First of all, because 
there was a lot there, because of both the wealth of the French 
economy and of the underdevelopment of the French banking system, 
which rendered the use of gold coins for large transactions neces­
sary (whereas in Britain cheques were commonly used). We must not 
forget, however, the essential role played by the House of Roth­
schild in connecting the French and British money markets. The 
archival evidence available shows that, in most British financial 
crises, the reserves of the Bank of England were refurbished with 
gold procured by Rothschild from France. The House of Rothschild 
intermediated between the gold and the silver sides of the inter­
national monetary system. They were the super arbitrageurs who had 
the huge reserves and prestige necessary to play successfully a 
role which remains to be described in full detail, but whose im­
portance it is possible to detect even in the present state of 
research. They were the "protectors" of Bank Rate. It is not with­
out importance that a Rothschild sat in the Court of Directors of 
the Bank of England and a French Rothschild occupied an equivalent 
position in the Directorate of the Banque de France.
Towards the end of the century, however, the precipitous fall 




























































































silver as a monetary standard in the whole developed world, re­
duced the role played by the French monetary system as a stabiliz­
er of the Gold Standard. France had herself to close the mints to 
silver, to avoid being flooded by a metal nobody seemed to want 
any more. In the remaining period, commonly referred to as the 
"heyday of the Gold Standard", the Bank of England's balancing act 
could continue with the help of two other shock absorbers, the 
Indian monetary system, still based on silver, and South African 
gold production. The Empire of India was kept by the British on a 
silver standard even when silver was fast depreciating against 
gold. This made exports of primary commodities and raw materials 
easy and undoubtedly was to a large extent responsible for the 
large export surplus India earned in the last part of the pre-war 
period. It is in the management of this surplus in a way conducive 
to the stability of the Gold Standard that the British financial 
elite proved most imaginative and successful. The Indian surplus 
was invested in London, in Government bonds or in deposits with 
the banking system. The "Council Bills" system, which had been 
devised to effect financial transfers between India and the Metro­
polis, was managed so as to keep the Rupee's value stable. The 
whole system, called the "Gold Exchange Standard", was extolled as 
a paragon of skill and efficiency by J.M.Keynes, in the book that 
first gave him notoriety, Indian Finance and Currency. Indeed, the 
young Keynes was right, as far as the functioning of the Gold 
Standard was concerned. Whether it was also efficient from the 
point of view of promoting Indian economic development, is entire­
ly another matter, and one with which Indian economic historians




























































































South African gold production also helped to stabilize the 
Gold Standard. All the gold mined there was commercialised in 
London, and the proceeds invested there, at least in the short 
run. It is easy to imagine how important the British monetary au­
thorities considered the control of that huge flow. This became 
evident, after the first world war, when an attempt was made to 
revive the Gold Standard. Following Professor Kemmerer's advice. 
South Africa decided in favour of the Gold Standard, and against 
pegging its currency to Sterling. The connection with London was 
cut, to the great discomfort of Montagu Norman who saw one of the 
main props of Sterling suddenly disappear.
If France, India and South Africa contributed to making the 
Gold Standard stable, the United States represented, throughout 
the century in which the Gold Standard lasted, one of the great, 
perhaps the single greatest, disturbing elements to its smooth 
functioning. After the political and economic forces which stood 
for an orderly financial development of the Republic had been 
routed in the first decades of the 19th century, the growth of the 
American economy took the spasmodic features it would keep until 
the Second World War. The United States was deliberately deprived 
of the Central Bank that Alexander Hamilton, imitating the Bank of 
England, had designed. Banks proliferated everywhere, following a 
model of wildcat finance which, if it promoted the phenomenal 
growth of the U.S. economy, also gave it a very strong cyclical 
pattern. For the whole Gold Standard period, the Bank of England 




























































































resort to the American financial system. The growth of American 
farm exports, coupled to local industrial growth and the peculiar 
development-underdevelopment of the U.S. banking system, gave rise 
to a notorious seasonal pattern of financial difficulties, which 
was called the "autumn drain". This recurred every year, when 
American crops were sold on world markets and the proceeds disap­
peared into the entrails of the completely decentralised American 
banking system, and, more generally, into the hands of American 
farmers. A gold drain was felt first in New York, the main U.S. 
financial centre. Interest rates rose violently, as there was no 
centralised banking reserve in New York, and the U.S. Treasury, 
which kept a very large gold reserve, knew only very imperfectly 
how to use it for stabilization purposes. The rise of New York 
rates would thus be transmitted to London, which kept the only 
free gold market. Gold would thus flow to New York and it would be 
months before it could be seen again, as farmers spent the pro­
ceeds of crop sales and U.S. local banks recycled the money back 
to New York.
To this seasonal drain, to which the Bank of England was 
never able to find a remedy, other sudden drains would be added, 
when the peculiar American banking system went into one of its 
recurrent panics. After the most violent of them had, in 1907, 
brought chaos to the whole international economy, the U.S. Con­
gress decided to move and the Federal Reserve System was estab­
lished, in 1913. But it took another twenty years, and another 





























































































We have dedicated considerable space to a summary of U.S. 
financial history because it must be fully appreciated what the 
peculiar structure of American finance meant for the world finan­
cial system in the age of the Gold Standard. What by the end of 
the century had become both the largest industrial producer and 
largest agricultural exporter, was still importing huge financial 
resources from the rest of the world. It lacked a central bank and 
had developed a thoroughly decentralised banking system which, if 
it was functional to rapid economic growth, had also a strong vo­
cation for recurrent instability. The U.S. Congress and Government 
also did their part to enhance instability, by unwise and partisan 
policies concerning, for instance, silver prices, and the manage­
ment of fiscal revenues.
In the last decade of the 19th century the crisis of silver 
induced a veritable stampede by Governments and Parliaments, in 
most countries, to adopt the Gold Standard. More than the unidi­
rectional movement of silver, it was its wild oscillations, made 
deeper by the inconsiderate silver policies of the United States, 
that convinced most interested parties to opt for gold. Even Euro­
pean farmers, who were fighting a desperate war against cheap New 
World imports, were reduced to favour the Gold Standard by the im­
possibility of forecasting a price for their harvest at sowing 
time. Industrialists in developing countries who had started im­
port substitution activities were in favour of a strong currency, 




























































































as a means of keeping out foreign industrial, products. Most coun­
tries, when they went on the Gold Standard, also started a cen­
tralised gold reserve, which they intended as an exchange stabil­
isation fund. Very often they surrounded this reserve by an out­
ward layer of foreign currency reserves, which they called upon 
under pressure in order to keep their gold reserve intact.
Contrary to what British monetary authorities thought and did 
after the First World War, their pre-war predecessors were ex­
tremely worried by the universal trend in favour of Central Bank­
ing and of the Gold Standard. They very correctly understood that 
Britain had succeeded in staying at the centre of the system as 
long as it remained a free flow system, where the only stock of 
gold was the one kept by the Bank of England. French gold accumu­
lation had been seen favourably, as it enhanced the masse de 
maneuvre of the Bank of England at almost no cost. But already 
German gold accumulation was a threat, as Germany did not believe 
in a free gold market and Bank Rate found obstacles in attracting 
gold from there. The German pattern was, unfortunately for Brit­
ain, the one that found the largest number of followers among 
countries that established a Central Bank, and a central reserve 
to manage the Gold Standard. The result was the increasing seclu­
sion of previously free flowing gold into large stocks, over which 
the British traditional control instrument Bank Rate scarcely ex­
ercised any leverage and which dwarfed in size the reserves of the 
Bank of England.
To these external difficulties, with which British monetary 
authorities were greatly concerned, others of a more domestic 




























































































The British financial system had emerged from the turmoil of 
the Napoleonic wars apparently unscathed. It was formed by a clus­
ter of merchant banks and other financial institutions, like the 
discount houses, and by the great commodity and service exchanges, 
and it had the Bank of England at its centre. The composition of 
the governing body of the Bank of England ensured that most City 
voices would get a fair hearing. It is impossible to exaggerate 
its internal homogeneity and cohesion (especially at a time like 
now when the system is definitively being demolished). A good 
study of the City in the years of the Gold Standard ought to be 
conducted by structural anthropologists, rather than by econom­
ists. A very serious threat to this semi-tribal system, which had 
succeeded in controlling world trade and payments for many dec­
ades, was developing fast in the late years of the Gold Standard. 
It was represented by the rapid concentration of British deposit 
banking, which resulted in the survival of only a handful of giant 
joint-stock banks. The Clearing Banks -as they came to be caJled- 
provided the City with a large part of the short term funds which 
were used as raw material to finance world commodity trade. They 
had huge branch networks which channelled savings from the remot­
est corners of Britain to London, and thence to all parts of the 
world through City intermediation. Thus the Clearing Banks provid­
ed the base for the whole British financial system. But their 
power was not constitutionalised by any matching responsibility. 
They had no say in the conduct of monetary policy. They were not 
represented in the Court of Directors of the Bank of England. 




























































































they might as well invade some of the markets traditional}y re­
served to merchant banks, and in particular they started invading 
the field of commodity trade financing. Finally, they began to 
lay the foundations for their own centralized gold reserve, alter­
native to that kept by the Bank of England.
Speaking more generally, a trend can be noticed in the last 
25 years of the pre-war Gold Standard, away from homogeneity and 
towards decentralization, in the British financial system. The 
Clearing Banks increasingly baulked at being disciplined by the 
Bank of England. Often, especially in times of crisis, they pulled 
the rug from under the financial establishment, by withdrawing 
their short term deposits with City houses. By this behaviour they 
showed their muscle and demanded recognition. This pattern is 
clearly detectable in the 1890, 1907, 1914 crises. It was a trend 
that greatly disturbed the financial elite and contributed, with 
the exogenous factors we have mentioned before, to making the Gold 
Standard more unstable. It could even be said that the loss of co­
hesiveness and homogeneity of the British financial system brought 
the Gold Standard to its demise, in July, 1914. The system col­
lapsed long before Britain entered the conflict.
THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE ECONOMISTS
The development of Gold Standard theory coincides with the 
development of economic theory. We have already mentioned the role 




























































































classical economists. A commodity money would obey the rules dic­
tated by Nature (of which even human behaviour was part) as far as 
its supply, demand, and price were concerned. Thus a monetary 
economy based on a pure metallic standard would enjoy all the ad­
vantages afforded by the presence of money, without being subject 
to the many disadvantages induced by a man-made currency not tied 
to a metal. For David Ricardo, the recommendation to adopt the 
Gold Standard meant not only preventing the Bank of England from 
usurping monetary sovereignty, which he recognised as a Parlia­
mentary prerogative,' it also meant giving the economic system a 
standard, like gold, which had the virtue of being a good approx­
imation to his invariant measure of value. He wanted to see the 
price system uninfluenced by political power, so that Nature would 
be free to play her game and gold would be distributed among the 
"different civilised nations of the earth, according to the state 
of their commerce and wealth, and therefore according to the num­
ber and frequency of the payments which they had to perform" (Ri­
cardo, 1951, p.52). If freedom of gold movements existed, this 
redistribution would soon bring about a state of rest, when gold 
had been allotted to each nation according to its needs and would 
not move again. If all countries promoted metallist reforms, fix­
ing a gold weight for their currencies, arbitrageurs would oper­
ate, within the gold points, to keep gold prices uniform. Gold 
would function as the numeraire of the world economic system and 
it would be enough to ensure gold arbitrage to guarantee uniformi­
ty of all the world price systems. There would be no need for 
arbitrage to involve other, bulkier, commodities, whose transport­




























































































that international trade would not take place. Commodities would 
move across countries according to the Law of Comparative Advant­
age, and the Gold Standard would make sure that this law did not 
suffer perturbations because of "unregulated" money supplies. 
"Regulation", of course, meant that fiduciary money would depend, 
for its supply, on the dynamics of the gold reserve of the issuing 
agency. Ricardo's view of how the world economy worked, based on 
his analysis of commodity currency systems, rapidly conquered not 
only the economics profession but also politicians and intellectu­
als. It was a scientific system of political economy, whose core 
was the Gold Standard. John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall were 
to refine and qualify that world view.
Mill analysed with great care the implications of a commodity 
money, whose exchange value would be equal to its cost of produc­
tion. He did, however, clearly point out the importance of the 
existing stock of gold relative to its current or even potential 
flow. The gold stock/flow ratio made full adjustment a lengthy 
process, so that, in the short run, the price level would be 
determined by the demand for, and supply of, money. He never 
doubted, however, that a commodity money would not be able to 
change the international production relations as they existed 
under barter. To him money was like oil in the wheels of moving 
mechanisms "a contrivance to reduce friction". He fully trusted 
that David Hume's adjustment mechanism would have only nominal 
consequences in the case of a discovery of a hoard of treasure in 
one country. This would raise prices there, discourage exports and 
induce imports. The resulting balance of payments deficit would 




























































































in the original country to their previous level. In Mill's opin­
ion, real effects would, however, result in the case of a loan 
from one country to another. Then a real transfer would have to be 
effected.
Neither Mill nor Marshall considered the Gold Standard a per­
fect system. Both of them opposed bimetallism at fixed rates. They 
believed that relative changes in the costs of production of the 
two metals would be likely, and that would involve a scarcity of 
the dearer metal and a shift in favour of the monetary use of the 
cheaper one. Instability was therefore built into the bimetallist 
system. Mill preferred a "limping" gold standard, where gold would 
be the only legal tender, and silver would be coined at market 
prices. John Locke's tradition obviously lived on.
Marshall's creative thinking in the field of monetary stand­
ards included "symetallisra" and the "Tabular standard". According 
to the first scheme, vaguely reminiscent of the oldest currency, 
the Lydian "Elektron", if the public wanted to give paper currency 
and receive metals, it could only get gold and silver together, in 
bars of fixed proportions. Marshall thought this would link the 
paper currency to the mean of the values of the two metals and 
make possible, by this stabler currency, a world monetary area 
including both the gold and silver countries. It is easy to recog­
nise in Marshall's scheme a forerunner of the contemporary Europe­
an Monetary System's ECU.
Marshall's Tabular standard, on the other hand, reintroduced 
the concept of a money of account separate from the medium of ex­




























































































and would be tied to an "official index number, representing aver­
age movements of the prices of important commodities" (Marshall, 
1923, p.36).
As far as the adjustment mechanism under a Gold Standard re­
gime was concerned, Marshall clearly saw the growing integration 
of capital markets replacing traded goods, arbitrage and gold 
movements as the chief instrument of adjustment. This of course 
meant recognising the importance of interest rate differentials 
and interest arbitrage. And, in turn, giving a great role to play 
to banks and Central Banks.
With J.S. Mill, Marshall, and in particular Irving Fisher, we 
begin to get out of the "naturalist” world view which permeates 
the writings of Ricardo, his inspirers, and his followers. The 
world is not run solely according to forces of nature, which it is 
the economist's role to discover and which cannot be violated 
without meeting an inevitable punishment. The Gold Standard is not 
a "scientific method" of organising a monetary regime. Like Mar­
shall, Irving Fisher thinks of it more in historical rather than 
scientific terms. It is something the world embraced by historical 
accident. Supply and demand conditions for gold and silver are un­
stable. The system is not perfect and is perfectible justifying 
proposals to make it work better.
As we advance toward what has been called the "heyday" of the 
Gold Standard, in the eyes of contemporary economists its virtues 
seem to pale and its vices to come into relief. To Knut Wicksell, 
under a commodity standard there is no guarantee that a causal 
link will be able to exist between money supply and price level 




























































































long view. Like the practitioner-theorists who staffed the British 
Treasury before 1914, Wicksel1 noticed that central banks, by 
keeping large gold reserves, had interposed themselves between 
gold supply and price movements. The price stabilisation function 
of central banks is recognised and the new institutional setup is 
in any case superior to a pure metallic standard, which in Wick- 
sell's eyes would be totally at the mercy of the vagaries of de­
mand for and supply of gold.
The "heyday of the Gold Standard" which (as we hope to have 
shown above) was in historical reality the beginning of its de­
cline, were thus also days of decline as far as Gold Standard 
theory was concerned. A growing scepticism begins to engulf Hume's 
price-specie flow mechanism. Commodity arbitrage is seen as pre­
vailing over gold arbitrage. Adjustment must involve real, not 
just nominal changes. International capital movements are brought 
increasingly into the picture. Stock adjustment in all sorts of 
markets is a phenomenon which fascinates the economic theorists of 
this age. From recognising stock adjustments to advocating stock 
management is a short intellectual distance and most of these 
theorists cover it at great speed.
Ironically, in the theoretical cycle the pendulum had swung 
in the 25 years before the First World War, away from Ricardo and 
Locke and towards Lowndes and Thornton. The pure metallic standard 
has lasted only "l'espace d'un matin" both in theory and practice. 
Economists had not been able to ignore the giant strides of bank­
ing and of world economic and financial integration. From Ri­
cardo's golden rules, simple and infallible, we move to Mill, 




























































































national and international monetary management. Doubts prevail 
over certainties. We cannot accept J.M. Keynes' post-war stric­
tures about the pre-war perception of the Gold Standard. It was 
not seen as immutable, frictionless, and automatic by its contem­
poraries. The seeds of post-war criticism and disenchantment were 
firmly sown before the war. In fact, we might go as far as to say 
that pre-war learned opinion was much less apologetic of the pure 
metallic standard than would be the post-war economists and poli­
ticians. Pre-war observers had realised that the Gold Standard was 
a game which had become increasingly hard to play precisely be­
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